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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 











ATLANTIC REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORP.,  
AND MIDDLESEX MANAGEMENT,  




On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. No. 2:18-cv-12532) 
District Judge: Honorable Esther Salas 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or  
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
on September 3, 2020 
 
Before: AMBRO, GREENAWAY, JR., and BIBAS, Circuit Judges 
 










Palani Karupaiyan appeals from the District Court’s order that granted the Defendants’ 
motion to dismiss his complaint, and from the order that denied his motion for reconsider-
ation. Because Karupaiyan raises no substantial issue in his appeal, we will summarily 
affirm the District Court’s orders. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6. 
Karupaiyan filed a complaint in August 2018, raising 14 causes of action against At-
lantic Realty Development Co., Inc., Middlesex Management, Inc., Oak Tree Village As-
sociates, LLC (collectively, “Oak Tree Village”), and D&G Towing. Oak Tree Village 
moved to dismiss Atlantic Realty, arguing that it had “no relationship, contractual or oth-
erwise,” with Karupaiyan. Dkt. #10-1 at 6.1 They argued that the claims against the re-
maining Oak Tree Village defendants should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure because some claims were time-barred and the others failed 
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 
Karupaiyan then filed a first amended complaint (“FAC”). Dkt. #22. The FAC con-
tained numerous defendants (19 total) and causes of action (93 total), with over 484 para-
graphs and 347 pages of exhibits. Oak Tree Village filed another motion to dismiss, repeat-
ing their argument that Atlantic Realty was not a proper defendant, and arguing that the 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
1 Our page numbers refer to the electronic pagination assigned by CM/ECF. 
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FAC should be dismissed for failure to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. Rules 8, 10, and 11, 
and that the complaint also should be dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure 
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Dkt. #38. Karupaiyan opposed the 
motion. 
The District Court granted Oak Tree Village’s motion to dismiss and extended that 
dismissal to all Defendants. The District Court determined that allowing Karupaiyan to 
amend his complaint would be futile. Dkt. #54.2 Karupaiyan timely moved for reconsider-
ation, which included a motion to allow him to file a second amended complaint. Dkt. #56.  
The District Court denied his motion, Dkt. #59, and Karupaiyan timely appealed. 
We have jurisdiction to review the District Court’s judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.3  
Karupaiyan’s complaint was subject to dismissal “if the pleading [did] not plausibly sug-
gest an entitlement to relief,” and our review of that question is plenary. Huertas v. Galaxy 
Asset Mgmt., 641 F.3d 28, 32 (3d Cir. 2011); Fleisher v. Standard Ins. Co., 679 F.3d 116, 
120 (3d Cir. 2012). But we review the District Court’s determination that the complaint 
 
2 In the same order, the District Court denied as moot Karupaiyan’s renewed motion, Dkt. 
#53, to expedite and to void a bench order entered by a New Jersey state court. Dkt. #54 
at 9. Karupaiyan does not mention that aspect of the order in his document filed in sup-
port of this appeal. But in any event, we find no error in the District Court’s decision to 
deny his motion, as the District Court lacked jurisdiction to void a state court’s order.  
See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005) (barring 
federal court review of “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries 
caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings com-
menced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments”). 
 
3 Karupaiyan moved to reopen in the District Court on August 3, 2020.  Because his mo-
tion was not filed within 28 days of the District Court’s judgment, it does not affect our 
jurisdiction. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(vi). 
4 
 
fails to meet the short-and-plain-statement requirement of Rule 8 for an abuse of discretion.  
See In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d 696, 702 (3d Cir. 1996). Likewise, denials of 
reconsideration and leave to amend are both reviewed for abuse of discretion. Jang v. Bos-
ton Sci. Scimed, Inc., 729 F.3d 357, 367–68 (3d Cir. 2013).  
We agree with the District Court that Karupaiyan’s difficult-to-follow complaint fails 
to suggest the existence of any plausible claim. A complaint must contain “a short and plain 
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).  
And in particular, “a complaint should set forth ‘who is being sued, for what relief, and on 
what theory, with enough detail to guide discovery.’” Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 
(3d Cir. 2004) (quoting McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 1996)). To survive 
dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 
(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 
We liberally construe Karupaiyan’s pleadings, which were filed pro se, see Dluhos v. 
Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir. 2003), but even under that relaxed standard his com-
plaint fails to state a plausible federal claim against any of the Defendants, see Fantone v. 
Latini, 780 F.3d 184, 193 (3d Cir. 2015) (stating that although a pro se complaint is held 
to less stringent requirements, it must still meet Twombly and Iqbal’s plausibility stand-
ard). Karupaiyan’s FAC lists more than 40 laws as a basis for his claims, but he does not 
explain which of the 19 defendants is liable under which law, such that they could mount 
an appropriate defense. See generally McHenry, 84 F.3d at 1178. The District Court gen-
erously construed Karupaiyan’s FAC and made every reasonable inference it could, despite 
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its incoherent and rambling nature. But since the FAC failed to state a claim upon which 
relief could be granted, the District Court’s dismissal was proper. 
Generally, a plaintiff should be given an opportunity to amend his complaint before the 
District Court dismisses it with prejudice. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 
103, 111 (3d Cir. 2002). But the Court need not give the plaintiff that opportunity if amend-
ment would be futile. Id. We agree with the District Court that Oak Tree Village’s first 
motion to dismiss informed Karupaiyan of the substantive problems of the claims in his 
original complaint, and that Karupaiyan remedied none of those issues in his FAC. We also 
agree that the FAC did not state any plausible federal claim for relief that amendment could 
cure. We agree with the District Court that many of the laws listed in the FAC do not 
provide for a private right of action. Dist. Ct. Order, Dkt. #54, ¶ 5. And we agree that most 
of the counts of the FAC “do not assert a cognizable cause of action under any existing 
state or federal law.” Id. ¶ 6.  What is more, many claims had been raised and rejected in 
prior state court proceedings, and others could have been brought in those state court pro-
ceedings. Id. ¶ 9 & n.6; see also Bennun v. Rutgers State Univ., 941 F.2d 154, 163 (3d Cir. 
1991) (noting that New Jersey’s entire controversy doctrine “precludes not only claims 
which were actually brought in previous litigation, but also claims that could have been 
litigated in the previous litigation”), abrogated on other grounds by St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. 
v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515–16 (1993).4 We thus conclude that the District Court did not 
 
4 We also take judicial notice that Karupaiyan has filed in the District Court a motion to 
reopen, with a proposed second amended complaint (“SAC”). Dkt. ##64, 65. It does not 
appear that the SAC remedies any of the substantive or procedural errors of the FAC. 
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abuse its discretion by dismissing the FAC with prejudice, or by denying Karupaiyan’s 
motion for reconsideration, which contained a motion to amend.5    
For all of these reasons, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s orders.6 
 
 
5 And we agree with the District Court that Karupaiyan’s motion for reconsideration 
failed to show an intervening change in controlling law, new relevant evidence, a clear 
error of fact or law, or any other extraordinary reason for reconsidering the District 
Court’s order. See Max’s Seafood Café ex rel. Lou–Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 
677 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 
6 Karupaiyan’s motion to expedite and his motion to summarily remand are denied. 
